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ABSTRACT
Post-communist Russia has entered a new stage after nearly two years of trying 
to reorient itself away from the former stereotypes of Soviet ideology. Russian 
involvement in conflicts on the territory of the ex-USSR was declared by Moscow as 
peacekeeping operations. This study discusses the conflict settlement in Moldova, 
Abkhazia and Tajikistan and attempts to indicate that the military operations in the CIS 
differ from the classical definition of peacekeeping within the theory of International 
Relations. This study also questions whether the case studies can be described accurately 
as the CIS peacekeeping operations. The appeal by Moscow to the international 
authoritative bodies to grant Russia peacekeeper’s status proposes a veiled desire toward 
the restoration of the Russian empire. Hence, peacekeeping has turned out to be a key 
element in Russian overall policy to rehabilitate and maintain its influence in the territory 
of the ex-USSR.
INTRODUCTION
The hopes for a new world order have given way to world-wide disorder. The 
threat of nuclear or large-scale conventional war has been reduced to nought, but the 
danger of small- and medium intensity conflicts has sharply increased. A gigantic belt 
of instability and military conflicts, to which hundreds of thousands of people have fallen 
victims during the last two years, has spread from Yugoslavia to Tajikistan. This is not 
a transient period, but may take a long period of time. There is a real danger that 
escalation of conflicts will take place both horizontally (involving new countries and 
regions) and vertically (escalation of violence), which is sometimes referred to as "the 
price of victory over Communism".'
On the other hand, today as never before there are great possibilities to avert 
conflicts, control crises and settle disputes. For the first time in decades major powers 
cooperate, rather than compete, in ensuring security. All this enhances the role of 
international organizations such as the United Nations and CSCE so that they may be 
transformed from confrontation forums to "workshops of peace".
At the July 1992 summit meeting in Helsinki the CSCE’s fifty-one participating 
states agreed that one of the greatest threats in post-Cold War Europe is posed not so 
much by disputes between countries as by conflicts involving - or appearing to involve -
' Dmitry Trenin, "Blazhenny Mirotvorzy” (Blessed are Peacekeepers), Novoe 
vremva. No.24, June 1993, p.8.
national minorities issues within a country.^
The collapse of the USSR has brought about an aggravation of regional and national 
contradictions within its territory. Moldova, Tajikistan, Abkhazia and Karabakh are only 
some of the ongoing conflicts. Evidently, the conflict in former Yugoslavia has the same 
root as conflicts in the ex-Soviet Union.
Like a suddenly released spring, in almost every part of the USSR, nationalism 
awakened hitherto dormant genes of reciprocal aggressiveness,^ that might be a result 
of a long history of the Tsarist Russian Empire which was full of internal uprisings, 
rebellions and wars that inevitably led to fierce suppression.
In order to put an end to national problems, the totalitarian regime of the 
Bolsheviks pursued a policy of assimilation of all nations into what formed the united 
depersonalized "Soviet people" This aim justified repression against nations. Following 
the principle "divide and rule", Stalin had the territory divided into several republics 
with artificially drawn borders, which was tantamount to putting a time-bomb under the
 ^CSCE Helsinki document«”The challenges of change”.1992.
Dmitry Volsky, "The Dniester Region in the "Arc of Instability," New 
Times, No.23, June 1992, p.8.
The term "united Soviet folk" had been one of the first aims in the Lenin- 
Stalin national policy until 1977 when new Constitution of the USSR was 
adopted which declared final success in creation of such a folk. Thus the 
officials claimed that in the USSR "national" problems did not exist 
anymore.
next generations to be later exploded. Not surprisingly, when pressure from Moscow had 
disappeared and, what is more, the country fell into deep economic crisis, pre-existing 
national movements in the republics clashed.
However, it would be oversimplification to view nationalistic movements in regions 
as the only approach to the conflicts. Another side of the coin is that the transitional 
period from the USSR to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) took too long 
a time, and caused in its turn, the absence of power in the republics for the settlement 
of conflicts in their embryonic stage. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 
1991 brought about the creation of the CIS. The CIS with a very weak status was 
supposed to be something like the former Union save the central administrative command 
system with "invisible" borders in it. The process went on until the beginning of 1993 
when the Charter of the CIS was approved at Minsk, defining the rights and duties of the 
member states. This interval was filled by the recognition of newly independent states 
not only by foreign countries but within the Commonwealth as well. Apparently, the 
majority of political leaders in the republics had not expected such a gift as real, 
meanwhile Russia did not expect them to be really independent either. There were 
several attempts to set up some common structures like the Joint Armed Forces with 
central command which were promptly rejected by the republican authorities as a return 
to the Union.
In addition, what made things worse, the conflict areas began to be an arena for
some politicians in their struggle for power as a means for faster career promotion. The 
absence of a diplomatic concept in Russia towards the "near abroad"“’ has caused very 
contradictory statements by the top Russian authorities to be issued. By concentrating on 
building the trust of the West, in particular of the US, the Russian president and 
government have dodged or, at least, postponed the exceptionally problematic but vital 
issue of building relations with the countries of the "near abroad".
Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Foreign minister Andrey Kosyrev could say 
about Moldova that it was not an intervention by Russia, but the defense of the people 
living there;'  ^while the Commander of the 14th Army, Major General Alexander Lebed 
and the former Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi accused Moldova of being a "fascist 
state" and its leader of being a "war criminal" who deserved to be hanged.’ On the 
contrary, the former Commander in Chief of the CIS Joint Forces, Marshal Evgenii 
Shaposhnikov, insisted that the Army had remained neutral in Moldova.**
There is a parallel with the case in Abkhazia which, despite claims by Moscow’s 
officials of their concern for stability and peace in the region, has been receiving
' The term "near abroad" began to be used in Russia in early 1992. It does 
not cover a precise geographical area but is used to mean the eleven 
countries that constituted the CIS in Dec.1991. For further information, 
see John Lough, "The Place of the "Near abroad" in Russian Foreign 
policy," RFE/RL Research report. Vol.2, No.11, pp.21-29.
 ^Komsomol skaya pravda, 21 May 1992.
 ^See Pravda, 9 July 1992, Izvestiva, 20 July 1992.
 ^ Vladimir Socor, "Creeping Putsch in Eastern Moldova", FE/RL Research
Report. Vol.l, No.3, Jan.1992, p.45.
military equipment and weaponry from Russia even after making a truce.
Under these conditions, when the old security system was broken apart but the 
number of "hot spots" increased in the CIS, an understanding grew concerning the 
necessity to have a new system of collective security with special forces to settle 
bloodshed in conflict areas. Russia initiated the process of establishing peacekeeping 
forces having considered the positive experiences of the United Nations. Meanwhile, the 
theory and practice of peacekeeping has not been perfectly formed even in the UN, not 
to mention the absence of its legal base. From this point of view, the CIS may serve as 
a polygon for the further implementation of its local experiences to the UN's practice and 
have enormous significance for an elaboration of the legal base. It also provides an 
experience of regional peacekeeping efforts in a situation where Russia is an extra burden 
through its historical and political involvement.
In this study two methods are employed. Firstly, the term peacekeeping in the theory 
of international relations is analyzed in order to compare to what extent conflict 
settlement in the CIS falls into the standards required by the UN. Secondly, dynamics 
of conflict resolution in the cases of Moldova, Tajikistan and Abkhazia were discussed 
considering the special role of Russia in these areas.
1.PEACEKEEPING IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
l . I .  The legal base of peacekeeping.
The history of civilization has witnessed a general trend in the development of the 
world community towards a "humanization"'' of international relations. Century by 
century mankind has approached the idea that there are some commonly recognized 
values such as territorial integrity, sovereignty, the settlement of conflicts by peaceful 
means, that cannot be violated.
The establishment of the United Nations put as one of the first purposes "to maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for 
the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in 
conformity with the principles of ju.stice and international law, adjustment or settlement 
of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."
The concrete measures to be taken by the UN to achieve this purpose are set out in
In the post-perestroika time the Soviet sources began to utilize the term 
"humanization” meaning the natural process of civilizing of human 
relations in the modern stage. This broad idea asserts the existence of 
common values for everyone and gives its preference to humanistic 
evaluation of each field concerned human being.
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the UN. Chapter VI provides for disputes to be 
brought to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly and for the 
former to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to recommend 
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. Essentially, the action of the Security 
Council is limited to making recommendations but the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes must be achieved by the parties themselves on a voluntary base.
If the means outlined in Chapter VI prove insufficient and the dispute escalates 
endangering the maintenance of international peace and security, then Chapter VII comes 
into play. According to Article 39, the Security Council "shall determine the existence 
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" and under Article 
41, may first take measures not involving the use of armed force, including "complete 
or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, postal, telegraphic, radio 
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations".
If the Security Council considers these measures to be inadequate it may take in 
accordance with Article 42, "such action by air, sea, or land forces, as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security, including demonstration, 
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United 
Nations".
envisaged by the Charter to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security, 
when the Security Council acts on behalf of the international community as a whole. Also 
it envisages co-operation and full agreement among the permanent members of the 
Security Council, but, this essential condition was not met because of the Cold War. 
Enforcement measures envisage to entail four elements;
- defining a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression;
- determining that it has taken place;
- identifying the parties concerned;
- military participation by the major powers.
The need for great power unanimity is evident under all four conditions. The UN 
failed to function as a collective security system not because it was conceptually 
defective, but because of the great power consensus, which had sustained the Allied 
effort during the Second World War and created the United Nations in its closing 
months, broke down rapidly after the war.
The inapplicability of Chapter Vll in its most important provision created a vacuum, 
which had to be filled somehow, and hence the development of peacekeeping operations. 
These operations can be considered as based on Article 40 of the Charter, which provides 
that before resorting to the action provided for in Articles 41 and 42, the Security
Ramish Thakur, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon. UN's Authority and 
Multinational Force, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p.l2.
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Council may take provisional measures to prevent an aggravation of the conflict situation 
without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of the parties concerned.” 
"Peacekeeping" became an alternative to collective security but not a legitimate 
alternative to the Chapter VII approach to collective enforcement, because peacekeeping 
explicitly recognizes that collective action to fight aggression is unlikely. It comes into 
play only after the hostilities have ceased and the parties consent to international
impervision. 12
Since peacekeeping was a post-Charter development, numerous questions have 
surfaced regarding its legality. So, in the early 1960s, following peacekeeping missions 
in the Middle East (1956), Congo, the Soviet Union, the East European states and France 
refused to pay the dues apportioned them for the cost of these missions, contending that 
the operations were illegal. They rest upon the fact that the General Assembly, rather 
than the Security Council, had played a major role in authorizing these peacekeeping 
activities. In that case, substantive action by the Security Council had been blocked by 
British and French vetoes so the Council referred the matter to the General Assembly 
that authorized the Secretary-General to set up peacekeeping operations. The International 
Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion that under the Charter, the Assembly has the 
right to make recommendations dealing with issues relating to the maintenance of
" For further information see, The Blue Helmets: A Review of Unitecd Nations 
Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 
1985).
Anthony C. Arend & Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of
Force. Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm, (London: Routledge, 1993), p.l79.
international peace and security as long as the Security Council was not dealing with 
them. Moreover, the Court argued that while it was true that only the Council could 
order states to undertake an enforcement action against another state, the Assembly could 
recommend that states take action that did not amount to an enforcement action. Since 
these peacekeeping missions were undertaken "at the request, or with the consent of the 
states concerned", they did not qualify as "coercive or enforcement action" requiring the 
Security Council authorization.'·^
Anthony Arend and Robert Beck argue that peacekeeping operations would seem to 
be lawful under certain circumstances:
"If it were authorized by the Security Council, there would be little doubt 
as to its permissibility since the Council authorized an enforcement action 
against a state, it would be clear that it could authorize a peacekeeping 
mission that did not involve action against a state. In addition, a 
peacekeeping operation authorized by the General Assembly would be 
permissible if it met three criteria. First, the Security Council could not 
be considering the issue at the time. Second, the operation could only be 
established pursuant to a recommendation of the General Assembly. Third, 
it would require the consent of the state on whose territory the forces were 
to be placed. It would follow logically that a peacekeeping operation 
undertaken by a regional arrangement also would be lawful as long as it 
met the same, criteria as peacekeeping authorized by the General 
Assembly".
Certain expenses of the UN, ICJ. 153.Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962. 
Anthony C. Arend & Robert J. Beck, op.cit. , p.181.
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1.2. Peacekeeping: definition and correlation with other related notions
Alan James asserts, the term "peacekeeping" has never formally been given a 
fixed and detailed meaning by the collectivity of states.'*’ There is no official UN 
definition either; however, the International Peace Academy has provided this generally 
accepted explanation of the peacekeeping:
"The prevention, containment, moderation of hostilities between states (or 
forces) through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention 
organized and directed internationally using multinational forces of 
soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain order.""’
Initially, the essence of peacekeeping of the UN, like preventive diplomacy, rested 
upon the necessity to exclude the great powers from spreading these rivalries into areas 
where they could be a source not merely of local but of world danger. From this point 
of view. Inis Claude in his "Power and International Relations" provides an explanation 
of the function of the UN peacekeeping forces:
"This is... not a device for defeating aggressors - and certainly not for 
coercing great powers determined to expand the sphere of their control - 
but for assisting the major powers in avoiding the expansion and 
sharpening of their conflicts... helping them to contain their conflicts, to
1.^ Alan James, op,cit..p>8.
International Peace Academy> Peacekeepers Handbook. (Pergamon, 1964), 
p.22.
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limit their competition, and to stabilize their relationship".<t 17
A more general definition of peacekeeping followed in UN Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld’s report; where peacekeeping is an operation involving military personnel, 
but without enforcement powers, established by the UN to help maintain or restore peace 
in areas of conflict.'*
The new doctrine initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the 1980s ushered in 
significant change for the UN’s potential role in conflict resolution peacekeeping. 
Systematically obstructed by the Soviet Union for decades, peacekeeping became 
appreciated as an indispensable mechanism for regulating and settling regional conflicts 
in the post Cold War era. A former Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN, 
Alexander Belonogov, defined peacekeeping as:
"In the traditional sense of the word. United Nations peacekeeping 
signifies the dispatch of military and civilian personnel on behalf of the 
UN to conflict areas to disengage the forces of the warring sides, to 
monitor a cease-fire and to. ensure compliance with the cease-fire 
modalities".'^
Some authors such as R.N. Swift have argued that peacekeeping operations are
Inis L. Claude. Power and International Relations (New York: Random 
House, 1962).
18 Cited in The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, p.3.
Alexander Belonogov, ’Soviet Peacekeeping Proposals,” Survival, 
Vol.XXXII, No.3, May/June 1990, p.207.
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more akin to armed police work rather than to standard combat. They have no military 
objectives, they are barred from active combat, they are located between rather than in 
opposition to hostile elements, and they negotiate rather than fight.^“ But UN 
peacekeeping has little in common with the concept of an "international police force", 
which assumes a delegation of supreme authority to the specially created body like a 
world federal government or at least some authority with supreme security functions. In 
addition, a police force, by its nature, cannot be impartial because its major purpose is 
to defend a particular social-legal order sanctioned by a particular state. "Our kind of 
peacekeeping assumes the necessity of acting in a world in which military power is 
controlled by states, although the states may on occasion delegate military force for 
international assignm ents.C.R.M itchell has pointed out that peacekeeping operations 
are analogous to municipal police forces." But these two operate under entirely 
different assumptions and conditions, and derive legitimacy from different authorities.
On the other hand, Alan James asserts that the development of defining a detailed 
meaning of peacekeeping is most unlikely, for "individual events and occasions are so 
multifarious, generalization is required if the overall character of international relations 
is to be grasped... In consequence, any abstract scheme of a definitional sort is probably
^ R.N. Swift, United Nations Military Training for Peace, International 
Organization, No.28, (Spring 1974), p.22.
■' John W.Holmes, "The Political and Philosophical Aspects of UN Security 
Forces," International Organization, Vol.XIX, No.3, 1964, p.296.
" C.R.Mitchell, "Peacekeeping:"The Police Function", Year book of world 
affairs, No.30, 1976, p.39.
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going to encounter difficulties at the margin, raising a question as to whether, on 
balance, this or that phenomenon should or should not be included within it".^^
As a whole, this term is used as a distinct type of international activity along with 
such terms as peacemaking, peacebuilding and preventive diplomacy, which have similar 
meanings but are different in the essence. In the general field of maintaining international 
peace and security, the UN may perform in different but related ways such as 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.
Essentially, peacekeeping operations and peace-making efforts are closely 
interrelated. The first promotes the second by creating conditions conducive to 
negotiating by stopping and containing conflict and creating the minimum goodwill 
necessary for settlement through negotiations or other peaceful means. On the other hand, 
the second helps the first, when peacemaking efforts provide hope for a peaceful solution 
of the conflict, the parties will be more inclined to observe a cease-fire and to co-operate. 
Conversely, the failure of one of them causes the failure of the other.
Peacebuilding as one of the UN actions is directed toward the construction and 
strengthening of all factors promoting peace but without the use of military force or
-·' Alan James, op. cit. , p.8.
Karaosmanoglu, All L. International Peace and United Nations Intervention 
in Intra-State Conflicts: A Policv-Oriented Inquiry Into the Limits of 
International Concern. Prepared for delivery to the Moscow IPSA Conference 
in August 12-18 1979.
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diplomatie bargaining. 25
Preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping are not utterly different in depending 
upon the consent of the states immediately involved in trouble situations for the 
introduction of international mechanisms. Both result from the impracticality of the 
collective security system. The distinctiveness lies in the substitution of global for local 
emphasis, the preoccupation with avoidance of the spread of superpowers into areas 
affected by disputes, rather than with settlement of conflicts. The aim of preventive 
diplomacy is to confine the conflict within local limits, and to achieve a kind of 
"disengagement before the act".^^
As in any operation, peacekeeping requires a presence of some assumptions which 
may coincide, and a change in the nature of one of them may affect the application of 
others.
Most scholars, such as Brian Urquhart or Johan Holst have crystallized the following 
interconnected basic requirements of peacekeeping:
- the consent of parties involved in the conflict to the establishment of the 
operation, to its mandate, to its composition and to its appointed
David Forsythe, ’United Nations Intervention in Conflict Situation 
Revised: A Framework for Analysis,” International Organization, (Winter, 
1969), p.118.
Ramish Thakur, op. cit. . p.l7.
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commanding officer;
- the continuing and strong support of the operation by the mandating 
authority, the Security Council;
- a clear and achievable mandate;
- non-enforcement of an external will or solution, the non-use of force, 
except in the last resort in self-defence - self-defence, however including 
resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peace-keepers 
from discharging their duties;
- the willingness of troop-contributing countries to provide adequate 
numbers of capable military personnel;
-maintenance of strict neutrality.-’
Alan James distinguishes the non-threatening character and impartiality as values of 
the whole concept of peacekeeping. From his point of view, these two principles 
represent the guidelines of the concept which constitute together with the other 
requirements the very core and essence of peacekeeping.
It should be pointed out that above mentioned set of principles is important not only 
as a matter of study but has two aspects; political and military.’^
At a political level they formalized an attitude which had been developing in the UN 
regarding the circumstances in which a peacekeeping force could be realistically deployed 
if it was to have any chance of success. At a military level, the troops thus deployed
For further information on principles of peacekeeping, see Brian 
Urquhart, "Beyond the 'sheriff's posse'," Survival, Vol.XXXII, No.3, 
May/June 1990, pp.198-199; Johan Holst, "Enhancing Peacekeeping 
Operations," Survival, Vol.XXXII, No.3, May/June 1990, p.265.
John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers. An Assessment of Peacekeeping operations 
at the Arab-Israel interface, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p.4.
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were required to execute their role in a commensurately gentle manner.
Here lies a distinction of military force engaged in peacekeeping, that peacekeepers 
can not coerce conflicting parties, but persuade and call them to observe the rules of a 
cease-fire or peace agreement.
1.3. Functions of peacekeepers
The question of which functions should be carried out during peacekeeping 
operations is still an open issue. Because, as in the case of defining the term, of 
peacekeeping, functions never formally have been given a fixed and detailed meaning 
neither from the international community nor from the UN. The individual conflicts are 
so multifarious and, consequently, functions to be carried out may vary from merely 
observation to punishment of violation of agreements. The strict definition of the 
peacekeepers’ functions can not grasp the overall character of international relations that 
may cause as a result an unnecessary limitation of the essence of the concept.
Keeping in mind, that they are only intellectual constructs, Johan Holst describes the 
spectrum of potential operations as follows;
-prevention of future conflict or the eruption of old conflicts;
17
-interposition by separating contestants and providing buffers; 
-restoration of a situation which has deteriorated;
-preservation of a tenuous and threatened peace;
-facilitation of political resolution and conciliation;
-protection of law and order, public safety and public services; 
-enforcement of the consensus by the Security Council;
-punishment of violation of agreements.
Only three functions are distinguished by Alan James but less explicit, such as:
-defusion by offering to get a group of military observers or peacekeepers 
to the scene of crisis, then
-stabilization by keeping peacekeepers to stay on with a view to maintain 
calm, and
-assistance in resolving disputes. 30
The latter approach seems to be more fruitful in the sense that functions may vary 
from conflict to conflict but there have to be main guidelines or directions that are 
constant of the concept.· '^
Johan Holst, OP. cit. , p.265.
^ Alan James, op.cit.. p.4.
For further information on peacekeeping operations, see Basic Facts about 
the United Nations (New York: The United Nations Department of Public 
Information, 1989), pp.32-38, 52-52; Everyone's United Nations (New York: 
The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1986), pp.105-121, 
136-138; R.E. Riggs & J.C. Plano, The United Nations; International 
Organization and World Politics (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988), pp.138-142;
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2. PEACEKEEPING IN THE CIS
2.1. Peacekeeping agreements and Russia’s special concern
The collapse of the USSR and an aggravation of regional conflicts in the 
beginning of 1992 brought about a feeling among the leaders of the new states that they 
could join their efforts in settling and preventing conflicts in their territories.
At the CIS summit meeting held on 20 March 1992 in Kiev, an agreement was 
signed on "Military Observation Groups and peacekeeping in the CIS" for the purpose 
of
"providing one another with assistance, on the basis of mutual agreement, 
in settling and preventing conflicts on the territory of any member of the 
Commonwealth that may arise on interethnic, religious, and political 
grounds, and that entails the violation of human rights.
This agreement provided that the CIS Council of the Heads of State by common 
consent would define the functions and tasks to the peacekeeping forces to be carried out
Sydney D. Bailey, The United Nations (London, The MacMillan Press, 1989) 
TASS, 4 March 1992.
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on a case-by-case basis. Such pre-conditions as consent of parties involved for cessation 
of fire and other hostile actions, their common request for peacekeeping were 
emphasized.
"Such a decision is adopted only in the event of a request being made by 
all conflicting sides and also on condition that agreement is reached 
between them on a cessation of firing and of other hostile actions before 
the peacekeeping force is sent".”
This agreement attempted to embrace the possible scope of functions like:
-separating the ethnic parties to the conflict;
-observing the fulfillment of accords on cease-fire or truces;
-monitoring compliance with accords on disarmament between the 
opposing sides;
-creating conditions for the peaceful settlement of di.sputes and conflicts 
that arise;
-assisting in guaranteeing human rights and freedoms;
-providing the humanitarian aid, including aid in the event of ecological 
catastrophes or natural disasters.”
The formation of peacekeeping force was supposed to be on a voluntary basis by 
states that are a party to the agreement with the exception of the conflicting sides through
Ibid.
Ibid.
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the provision of contingents of servicemen, of military or civilian observers, or other 
civilian personnel. This agreement was signed by ten of the eleven CIS member states 
save Turkmenistan. While Ukraine signed under special condition that her Supreme 
Soviet would determine Ukrainian participation on a case-by-case basis.
The following CIS summit meeting was held in Tashkent on 15 May, 1992. The 
question of setting up a peacekeeping force remained in the background of a broader 
debate over an agreement on collective security but the agreement on collective security 
was signed only by six states excluding Ukraine, Belorussia, Azerbaijan and Moldova.
The continuing violence in Moldova and other regions forced the Heads of State 
at the Mo-scow summit on 6 July, 1992 to agree that peacekeeping force should be 
established as soon as possible. By 12 August, 1992 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan. Armenia and Moldova had signed a "protocol on temporary procedures for 
the formation and functioning of military observers and collective peacekeeping force" 
(the full text of which has not been published in the media) and joined Russia in pledging 
to support and participate in these forces. According to this protocol each of the
signatory states would be obligated to send military units and armaments to the 
peacekeeping force and to appoint experts to .serve in a team of military observers. 
Political decisions on involving peacekeeping forces are to be taken by the Council of the 
CIS heads of state on the basis of consensus and upon the receipt of an application from 
one or more member states for the aid of peacekeeping force with immediate notification
21
to the UN Security Council and the chairman of the CSCE.
However, the peacekeeping protocol, like most of other agreements signed at the 
CIS meetings, for several reasons remained only on paper and failed to be fulfilled. The 
CIS Joint Armed Forces Deputy Commander in Chief, Boris Pyankov, complained in his 
interview that to date Russia appealed to be the only CIS country ready to provide and 
currently providing peacekeeping.^“’ According to published data the total size of 
Russian forces participating in peacekeeping, exceeded twenty thousand people by the 
end of 1993."'’
Apparently, one of the main reasons of the failure of the all-CIS agreements lies 
in a fear of the restoration of the former Soviet regime through Russian domination. This 
fear did not appear artificial while some Russian officials like Evgeny Ambarzumov, the 
chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee for Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
Economic Relations, in his report to lz.vcsriya mapped out Russia’s role as a "Eurasian 
gendarme". He stated that Russian foreign policy could be based on a doctrine that 
proclaims the entire geopolitical space of the former Union a sphere of vital interests 
(following the example of the US "Monroe Doctrine" in Latin America). He also 
underlined the necessity to obtain from the world community understanding and
Interfax, 12 November 1992.
Novoe vremya. No.46, Nov.1993, p.23.
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recognition of Russia’s special interests in this space. 37
In respect to the question of outside intervention in conflicts in the ex-USSR by 
the United Nations, CSCE, NATO or other organizations, Russia’s authorities have been 
in explicit opposition. The CIS Commander-in-Chief Evgenii Shaposhnikov argued that 
the CIS is capable enough of dealing with all the issues that arise within the CIS.^ *'
In fact, Russia is encouraging the deployment of the CIS peacekeeping forces in 
countries that only recently gained their independence from the Russian-dominated 
USSR. As well, Russia is dominating these forces. This would mean the reimposition 
of Russian influence, power and perhaps even control in these countries, albeit in a 
slightly different form.
Sometimes Russian officials justify their domination as a defense of the "external 
frontiers" of the CIS which may become "near frontiers" as in Tajikistan’s case, or as 
a protection of the Russian-speaking civil population in the newly independent states. 
Russian Foreign Minister Audrey Kozyrev overtly .stated that Russia will be firmly 
protecting the rights of the Russians in other states of the Commonwealth and will be 
using forceful methods if needed.^’ Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has been
37 Izvestiva, 7 August 1992.
Russian Television, 11 July 1992, Cited in S.Crow, "Russian Peacekeeping: 
Defence, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.l, No.3, 
p.39; The Russian nationalist opposition compared the UN-sponsored 
intervention in Yugoslavia to "a testing ground for rehearsing an invasion 
of Russia." Interfax, 13 August 1992.
Nezavisimava aazeta, 1 Apr.1992.
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even more straightforward, stating that he would answer any infringement upon the 
honor and dignity of the Russian population in any part of the CIS with the most resolute 
measures right up to the dispatch of armed units/”
Another explanation of Russia’s concern is that Russia uses regional peacekeeping 
as an instrument of diplomacy that may, if conducted responsibly and effectively, stand 
to raise Russian prestige both locally and internationally as a country’s overall diplomatic 
effort to improve relations with the successor states to the USSR/'
After all, the feeling of responsibility for the conflicts in the "near abroad" exist 
not only among Russian politicians, but also among Russian citizens; However, the 
opinion poll, conducted by Professor B.A. Trushkin in the Fall 1993 witnessed that the 
majority of people in the Russian Federation support the settlement of conflicts trough 
means other than military:
1.Should Russia take the responsibility for the settlement of conflicts on 
the territory of the former USSR?
Yes: 44.2% No: 46.5% Abstain: 9.3%
ITAR-TASS, 5 June 1992.
For further information see, Suzanne Crow, "Russian Peacekeeping: Defence, 
Diplomacy, or Imperialism?", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.l, No.37, October 
1992, pp.37-40; S. Crow, "Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional 
Peacekeeping," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.2, No.15, January 1993, pp.28- 
32.
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2. Which measures to be taken by Russia might be the most efficient ones?
Econ: 38.0% Dipl: 32% 
Mil:4.5% Abstain:8.9%
Pol: 16.5%
42
The failure of collective security and peacekeeping arrangements, and more likely, 
the fear among some officials in Moscow that if Russia does not take action NATO 
would necessary become involved, activated Russia’s policy in 1993 toward interethnic 
conflicts to gain international approval and funding for Russian operations to bring 
conflicts under control.
On 28 February 1993, President Boris Yeltsin stated:
"Russia continues to have a vital interest in the cessation of all armed 
conflicts on the territory of the former USSR. Moreover, the world 
community is increasingly coming to realize our special responsibility in 
this difficult matter. 1 believe the time has come for authoritative 
international organizations including the UN, to grant Russia special 
powers as guarantor of peace and stability in this region."“'^
Yeltsin’s idea was clarified in a draft declaration to the committee responsible for 
reviewing the UN Charter. The main thrust of the draft was that the UN should use 
regional organizations to manage peacekeeping operations in order to lighten the Security
Opinion poll, Novoe vremva. No.31, July 1993, p.l3. 
ITAR-TASS, 1 March 1993.
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Council’s load, which could then allow the special features of different parts of the world 
to be taken into account. However, the reaction of the UN members to this proposal was 
muted.
Despite the fact that Russia has not been officially recognized as a peacekeeper by 
the world community and international organizations such as the UN or CSCE, and while 
CIS collective security and peacekeeping arrangements have until the present been a 
failure, Russia has had few reservations about in sending peacekeeping troops into 
conflicts areas. Thus Moldova, Tajikistan and Abkhazia have become an arena for the 
first peacekeeping operations staged in the Commonwealth.
2 .  2 .  M o l d o v a :  t h e  f i r s t  e x p e r i e n c e
The conflict between Moldova and the self-proclaimed "Dniester republic" is one 
of the most politically and militarily complicated among the others in the CIS; especially 
considering the overt support of the Russian Fourteenth Army of the "Dniester republic".
Due to the escalation of armed conflict in the very beginning of April 1992, the 
meeting of the officers of the 14th Army took a decision to begin a separating function 
on their own. On 8 April, 1992 the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies put the issue
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of the "Dniester republic" into the agenda and decided to create a peacekeeping force 
composed of volunteers from the 14th Army."^
However, this initial proposal of Russia to use the 14th Army as a peacekeeping 
or "separating" force was rejected by Moldova, Ukraine and Romania, who were 
concerned parties in the conflict. They argued that the Army was "excessively 
politicized" and hence not suitable for this role. Moldova criticized the decision adopted 
by the Russian Congress on 8 April, 1992 as gross interference into the internal affairs 
of Moldova and a violation of the principles and norms of the UN Charter. The 
President of Moldova, Mircea Snegur, claimed that Russia was "nostalgic for the former 
Soviet regime" and was attempting "to restore the empire under Lenin’s flag" by staging 
the conflict in Moldova.^·’
The participation of the Army in the conflict has been recognized neither by 
Moscow’s nor by military officials. The Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Forces, 
Marshal E. Shaposhnikov, insisted that the Army did not take part at all and remained 
neutraL^ whereas his first Deputy Chief-of-Staff Colonel General B. Omelichev 
criticized the Moldovans by saying that they "should very carefully distinguish" between 
the soldiers and people who merely dressed in the Soviet Army uniform and carried
Apparent promptness of the Congress may be explained only as their willing 
to put legal base under the decision of the officers to act as 
peacekeepers.
Izvestiya, 21 May 1992./
Weekly review, RFE/RL Research report, Vol.l, No.16, p.67.
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weapons. 47
Former Russian Army Commander Netkachev (January - July 1992) made the 
strange statement that the units involved in the fighting had "disobeyed his orders" and 
"gone out of his control.'"** Only the new Commander of the Russian 14th Army, Major 
General Alexander Lebed (appointed in late June 1992) announced overtly that the Army 
recognized the "Dniester republic" as legal and sovereign, and described his army as 
belonging to them. Moldova was accused of being a "fascist state" with a leader who 
deserved to be hanged as a "war criminal."*“'
In conversation with the newly accredited Canadian ambassador in Cishinau, 
Snegur confessed that Moldova would call for the deployment of the UN or CSCE, 
sponsored peacekeeping forces only in the event of the collapse of the quadripartite 
negotiations among Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Romania on settling the Dniester 
conflict.·''"
Several negotiations took place in the first half of 1992 indicating the 
impracticality of using the 14th Army for a peace settlement, which resulted in the
47 Vladimir Socor, "Russian Forces in Moldova,” RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol.l, No.34, 1992, p.29.
·"* Krasnava zvezda, 9 May 1992.
See: Pra vda, 9 July 1992; Izvestiva, 20 July 1992
M) Moldovapres, 22 Apr.1992; Weekly Review, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.l,
N0.19, 1992, p.63.
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decision to send a "joint peacekeeping" mission but, afterwards, Belarus, Bulgaria and 
Romania opted out of participating in the force.
A UN fact-finding mission which arrived in Moldova in late June 1992 was 
prevented from inspecting the situation in the Transdniester area owing to sniper fire and 
the threat of attack. Moldova’s request for CSCE assistance during the Helsinki summit 
failed to win a positive response, due to the continuation of fighting.
On 3 July 1992 the President Snegur and President Yeltsin, signed the agreement 
providing the following steps toward settling the conflict:
-a cease-fire;
-the creation of a demarcation corridor between the forces;
-the introduction of a "neutral peacekeeping force";
-the granting of "political status" to the left bank of the Dniester by the
Moldovan Parliament;
-bilateral negotiations for the withdrawal of the 14th Army from
Moldova.’'
On the evening of 29 July 1992 the first peacekeeping troops consisting of 3800 
Russians, 1200 Moldovans and 1200 members of the Dniester National Guard landed in 
the "Dniester region". They experienced casualties during the first month of service, but
Weekly review, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.l, No.29, 1992, p.73
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armed hostilities among the opposing sides ceased. But it would be misleading to connect 
the cessation of armed conflict only with the fact of the sending in of peacekeepers. 
Rather, it was the direct result of reaching agreement between the two Presidents Snegur 
and Yeltsin.·'^
2.3. Tajikistan: attempts at collective response
The Tajik civil war, which began in May 1992, was described by Russian media 
as a real threat not only to neighboring countries Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but also 
for the rest of the Commonwealth, not to mention the territorial integrity of Tajikistan 
itself.·'’^  The daily battles of the Russian border guards on the Tajik-Afghan frontier with 
the Tajiks, who had slipped into Afghanistan to supply themselves with weapons from 
the Afghan resistance, contributed to the complexity of situation.
For further information on Moldova's conflict, see Suzanne Crow, 
"Russian Moderates Walk a Tightrope on Moldova," RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol.l, No.20, May 1992; Ksenia Myalo, "Pridnestrov'e Tsveta Khaki" 
(Pridniestrovje of Khaki Color), Novoe vremva. No.16, April 1992; Vladimir 
Socor, "Creeping Putsch in Eastern Moldova," RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol.l, No.3, 1992; "Isolated Moldova Being Pulled into Russian Orbit," 
Vol.2, No.50, December 1993; "Moldova's "Dniester" Ulcer", RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol.2, No.l, January 1993; "Moldova; Democracy Advances, 
Independence at Risk," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.3, No.l, January 1994; 
"Russia's Fourteenth Army and the Insurgency in Eastern Moldova," RFE/RL 
Research Reports Vol.l, No.36, September 1992.
Sergei Modestov, "A Shto Dumaet "Genshtab"? Какіе prichiny delayut nashe 
vmeshatelstvo v problemy Tajikistana chem-to, samo soboi razumeechemsya? 
(What does "Genshtab" think about? What are the reasons of our 
interference to Tajikistan?), Novoe vremva, No.31, August 1993, pp.12-13.
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The 201st Motor Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan under a bilateral 
agreement with Russia maintained studied neutrality throughout the conflict under specific 
orders not to intervene actively on either side of conflict. The division was commanded 
by a Tajik general, Ashurov. The Tajik nationalist-democratic-Islamist opposition accused 
the Russian troops of clandestinely supplying the pro-communist forces with weapons.'^
An assault on Dushanbe undertaken by leaders of the Popular Front, Safarali 
Kendzhaev and Rustam Abdurahimov, for the control of the capital, brought about the 
interference of the 201st division to protect government buildings and vital installations 
(such as the Nurek Dam, one of the world’s highest, and a crucial energy supplier for 
the republic, which the Kulyab guardsmen threatened to blow up) against all attackers. 
Thus, the 201 St division obviously rescued the ruling regime and stopped bloodshed.
In August 1992, the Chairman of the Tajikistan Parliament, A. Iskandarov, 
appealed to the CIS summit of the Heads of State to send a peacekeeping force. Then a 
group of military observers from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the CIS Armed 
Forces Headquarters visited a part of southern Tajikistan where fighting was occurring. 
The observers assessed the potential danger for the rest of the CIS and the possibilities 
for reconciling the warring groups.'’'
Bess Brown, "Central Asian States Seek Russian Help," RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol.2, No.25, 1993, p.85.
ITAR-TASS. 31 Aug. 1992. From the Russian point of view the Tajik war
constituted a threat for peace and stability in the CIS of spreading of 
Islamic fundamentalism to neighboring states. Leaving Tajikistan without 
support could have opened doors for free supply of weaponry into Central
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The next summit of the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan held in Almaty on 4 November 1992 (where Russian Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev attended as an observer), was called to discuss how to end the fighting in 
Tajikistan, and issued a five-point statement calling for the Russian 201st division to 
continue its peacekeeping role until a CIS peacekeeping force could be formed.
On 28 August 1992, Marshal E. Shaposhnikov and the President of Tajikistan 
Rahmon Nabiev reached a preliminary agreement on the deployment of the CIS 
peacekeeping force in Tajikistan. But a statement signed by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia on 3 September suggested that military intervention 
might be undertaken under the terms of the collective security agreement.*'* But the 
proposal of Kyrgyzstan to use the Kyrgyz troops as peacekeepers met a veto of its 
Supreme Soviet which voted resolutely that no Kyrgyz troops would be allowed to 
become involved in Tajikistan, because there was no stabilization in the conflict and it 
could mean an interference in the internal affairs of another state.
Uzbekistan limited its participation in conflict settlement by bombardment of 
dangerous, from their point of view, bases of the opposition. Uzbekistan has had long 
territorial disputes with Tajikistan and, what is more important, an active participation 
could cause unpredictable consequences for millions of the Uzbeks living in Tajikistan.
Asia from Afghanistan, because the borders among the Asian states are only 
conventional and not being protected at the moment.
ITAR-TASS. 3 Sept.1992 .
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In its turn, the legislature of Kazakhstan did not give the necessary approval for 
participation in peacekeeping until April 1993 when the civil war within Tajikistan almost 
ended, with the exception of the battles on the Tajik-Afghan frontier.
In short, despite the fact that the leaders of the Central Asian states, especially 
Uzbekistan, considered, very consciously, the threat of escalation of the war and Moscow 
started playing a more assertive policy in this region, the establishment of the CIS’s 
special peacekeeping force failed again. This status was granted to the Russian 201st 
division.
The peculiarity of the settlement of this conflict lies not in the success in reaching 
peace among warring parties but in the active outside support of the government in 
Dushanbe. This support and humanitarian aid helped to maintain a minimum of order 
in the country. It involuntarily leads to a parallel with Afghanistan, where nearly the 
same policy was pursued by the USSR.
Arguably, the new Russian policy of clear intervention on the .side of one of the 
parties in the Tajik civil war is only likely to harden positions on both sides in Tajikistan 
and to make Russian troops renewed targets of guerilla warfare in terrain unsuitable for 
conventional combat.'’’
Keith Martin, "Tajikistan: Civil War Without End?", RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol.2, No.33, 1993, p.29; See also Arkadii Dubnov, "Katastrofa v 
Tajikistane" (The Catastrophe in Tajikistan), Novoe vremva. No.4, January 
1993, pp.13-16; Bess Brown, "Tajik Civil War Prompts Crackdown in 
Uzbekistan," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.2, No.11, March 1993, pp.1-6.
33
2.3. Abkhazia: the failure of peace settlement
Several thousands of people have fallen victim to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict 
since the summer of 1992. Russia was deeply involved in this conflict, albeit Georgia 
became a member of the Commonwealth only in the end of 1993'’'* and was not a 
signatory to the CIS’s collective security and peacekeeping arrangements.
There are several explanations for the Russian involvement; first, Russia’s 
perception of the danger of the geographical proximity of the Abkhaz struggle to several 
autonomous republics in the Russian Federation that might attempt to secede. Second, 
the active participation of the Russian citizens in fighting what is an issue for Russia to 
contend. Third, the ethnically Russian population living in Abkhazia (around 1(X) 
thousand people what is roughly the same size as the Abkhazes) was put in a 
predicament. Fourth, the strategic significance of an outlet to the Black Sea. Finally, the 
Russian troops that remained stationed in Abkhazia and in Georgia became targets for 
armed raids.·’“'
But these explanations do not provide a clear picture of what is actually happening 
in Abkhazia. Though the Russian officials perceived that Abkhazia might be an example
The Georgian leader E. Shevardnadze appealed for a membership as a last 
resort to settle the conflict.
Elizabeth Fuller, "Russia's Diplomatic offensive in the Transcaucasus, " 
RFE/RL Research Report. Vol.2, No.39, 1993, p.34.
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for other autonomous republics to secede from the Russian Federation, Russia still 
supported the Abkhaz secessionists. On the other hand, the intention of Abkhazia to 
secede from Georgia and to attach itself to the Russian Federation might have been an 
additional incentive for Russian interference.
Another side of the coin is that Russia lost almost all important ports of the Black 
Sea to Ukraine and the success of the Abkhaz secessionists could potentially widen the 
Russian outlet to the sea. This outlet would be an additional trump card for Russia to 
play against Ukraine in any discussion regarding the Black Sea Fleet. And the only 
Russian port Novorossiisk is overloaded and its capacity does not allow for the transport 
of goods in and out of Russia, causing large economic losses.
Russian journalist A. Kasaev observed (18 August, 1992) political, military and 
economic interests in the area were indeed likely to draw Russia into the conflict.*’" 
There is no doubt that Russia has military interests in this area but the dissolution of the 
USSR sharply reduced the quantity of military ba.ses in the Caucasus. Moreover, the 
withdrawal and replacement of military troops not only from Georgia but from other 
regions as well is still too heavy burden for the flagging economy of Russia.
The Russian assertive policy towards the former Soviet republics may yet find its 
justification in the case of success in the settlement of conflicts. The first Russian
ITAR-TASS, 21 Aug.1992.
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mediation effort resulted on 3 September 1992, in the signing by Georgian State Council 
Chairman, E.Shevardnadze, the Chairman of the Abkhaz Parliament, V.Ardzinba, the 
Russian President, B. Yeltsin and representatives of those republics in the North Caucasus 
who dispatched their volunteers to the conflict area, an agreement for a cease-fire and 
withdrawal of Georgian troops from the conflict zone. However, the agreement was not 
implemented by Georgian Minister of Defence Tengiz Kitovani, who refused to comply 
with the agreement to withdraw troops.* '^ The subsequent bilateral Georgian-Russian 
talks and the new Abkhaz cease-fire agreement scheduled to go into effect on 20 May 
1993, failed again due to an escalation of conflict.
The UN’s nascent involvement after the appeal by Shevardnadze to the UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Ghali, who resolved to di.spatch military observers to the 
region, activated Moscow to find a compromise solution, and on 25 July, Shevardnadze 
voiced his acceptance of a proposed cease-fire followed by gradual demilitarization and 
the withdrawal from the combat zone of both Georgian troops and units from the North 
Caucasus, under the supervision of a tripartite (Russian, Georgian and Abkhaz) 
commission.
The Abkhaz government, accusing the Georgians of sabotaging the agreement at 
virtually every session of the tripartite monitoring commission, renewed its offensive 
against Sukhumi on 16 September 1993. The Russian Foreign Ministry condemned the
Catherine Dale, "Turmoil in Abkhazia: Russian Responses," RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol.2, No.34, 1993, p.52.
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Abkhaz offensive and reiterated its readiness to continue mediation. After almost two 
weeks of fighting the Georgians abandoned the city. The Abkhaz subsequently 
consolidated their control over the entire territory of Abkhazia.
The armed conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia stopped but negotiations 
continued with participation of UN mediators. On 1 December 1993 a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed by Georgian and Abkhaz governments that is expected to serve 
as the basis for a permanent settlement of conflict.'’·
For further information on the conflict in Abkhazia, see Elizabeth 
Fuller, "Russia's Diplomatic Offensive in the Transcaucasus," RFE/RL 
Research Report, vol.2. No.39, September 1993; "The Transcaucasus: War, 
Turmoil, Economic Collapse," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.3, No.l, Sc 
January 1994.
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3. THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE CIS
As it might be concluded from the previous chapters, there is a significant gap 
between theory and practice. Although the conflicts which took place in Moldova, 
Tajikistan and Abkhazia are different in essence, they have similarities in certain 
respects.
The first and the most important feature is that in both in Moldova and Tajikistan 
peacekeeping troops were declared outside the terms of agreements reached among 
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, whereas Georgia was not a 
member from the very beginning. Secondly, in all the areas of conflict, former Soviet 
troops were present in the vicinity and at the negotiations on withdrawal, although the 
time of the withdrawal continues to be a matter of dispute.^^
Third, all leaders of states where conflicts took place expressed a preference for the 
deployment of either the CSCE or UN peacekeepers, or both, rather than Russian- 
dominated peacekeeping forces, and they lamented that such solutions were, for various 
reasons, impos.sible.
Fourth, the peacekeeping force from the Russian side far outnumbered those of the other 
sides participating in the intervention.
For further information see, Stephen Foye, "Russian Troops Abroad: 
Vestiges of Empire," RFE/RL Research Report. Vol.l, No.34, 1992, pp.15-19.
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The comparison between the generally accepted principles of UN peacekeeping 
and the practice of conflict settlement in the former USSR witnesses that none of the 
several principles (elaborated in section 1.5) was implemented, while, it is noteworthy 
that only their full coincidence might be named as peacekeeping.
Consent of parries involved. All leaders of states where conflicts took place had 
been acting initially against the participation of the Russian troops in peacekeeping but 
then gradually accepted them de facto.
Conrinuinv and srronv support of the operation hv the mandarine authority. Even 
within Russia, which played the role of guarantor of peace, there was no unanimity 
toward conflict resolution, which caused, from time to time, essential contradictions 
among statements of various officials. For instance, viewing the failure of settlement in 
Abkhazia. Russian Minister of Defense Grachev proposed additional forces which were 
initially rejected by Shevardnadze, and his consequent acceptance after two days was 
contradictory.
Non-enforcement of an external will or solution was overtly violated in Tajikistan, 
where Russia provided strong support to the government. In Moldova the Russian 14th 
Army supported the "Dniester republic". All of this is radically different from UN 
practice and appears to be more like interference into the internal affairs of another state.
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The willimincss of rmop-comrihurinQ coumries to provide adequate numbers of 
capable miliraiy nersonnel. After multilateral negotiations on Moldova’s conflict, 
Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine accepted to send their troops but finally refused. The 
same was valid in Tajikistan when Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan failed to convince their 
parliaments of the necessity to participate in peacekeeping.
Mainrenance of arrict neurralitv was violated in every conflict by Russian troops 
stationed in fighting regions that had willingly or unwillingly become involved; even the 
Russian Defence Ministry admitted to isolated cases of Russian troops taking part in 
combat operations.
Two basic guidelines established in the 20 March 1992 agreement on 
peacekeeping were forgotten. First, peacekeeping forces were introduced into zones 
where there was still active conflict; and second, the states contributing troops did not 
represent neutral forces but were rather involved in conflicts. Thus, peacekeeping 
missions turn the logic of such missions on its head, blurring the question of the 
mission's purpose.
On the other hand, Russian officials and media continue to describe the 
deployment in Moldova as falling under the auspices of the CIS’s peacekeeping forces 
despite the fact that no such force yet existed and the terms of its establishment had not 
been completed or agreed to. Similarly, the troops in South Ossetia (a region of Georgia)
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were referred to as a "CIS peacekeeping mission", yet this application is incorrect. 
Georgia was not a member of the Commonwealth and is not a signatory to any of the 
peacekeeping arrangements. The agreements for the operations were bilateral and came 
into being before general CIS peacekeeping agreements had been implemented.
All this leads to the conclusion that the Russian- dominated peacekeeping efforts 
in the CIS differ from the classical definition within the theory of international relations 
and cannot be described accurately as CIS peacekeeping operations. These operations 
derived from the necessity to settle ongoing conflicts on the one hand, and the failure to 
arrange a collective peacekeeping force in the CIS, on the other. Russia undertook 
independent initiatives in the framework of, what it regards as, its sphere of influence, 
i.e. the territory of the former USSR.
41
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION
The escalation of conflicts in the ex-USSR put a new question onto the 
agenda: who is able and willing to be the guarantor of peace and stability in the 
CIS if not Russia? This role cannot be imposed upon the rest of the 
Commonwealth without their consent. The only logical outlet from a stalemate 
situation might be to sign a collective agreement on peacekeeping forces in the 
CIS.
I
The Russian sources assert that Russia may succeed in peacekeeping in the 
CIS territory if following questions would be answered. First, to which extent 
might the peacekeeping mandate be extended into the Commonwealth countries 
and what is the line beyond which peacekeepers turn to gendarmes? Second, how 
to avoid involvement in internal conflicts and whether involvement would be an 
interference in internal affairs. If Russia supports a regime which promises peace 
and stability would it be justified? Third, how should Russia act to avoid any 
reproaches in pursuing an imperialistic policy? Fourth, how to explain to the 
military forces, who have not participated in such missions, what is allowed and 
what is not according to the peacekeeping mandate? Finally, how to finance the
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operations when all countries are in deep economic crisis?'^
For nearly two years (1991 and 1992) Russian foreign policy was in deep 
disarray in trying to reorient itself away from the former stereotypes of Soviet 
ideology and of the image of the "Russian threat" to the West while a new 
strategy was to be formed and elaborated. In the first half of 1993 the Russian 
leadership became conscious of losing influence in every field of international 
relations that used to be under its grip.
The identification of Russian needs shifted the centerpiece of Moscow’s 
policy to the reassertion of its hegemony over the former Soviet Union and, to 
a lesser extent, East/Central Europe. These territories were recognized as 
Russia's sphere of vital interests in order to prevent "the use of these areas as 
platforms for threats to Russian security, and to ensure that these areas act as 
bridges from Russia outward rather than as firebreaks isolating Russia from the 
outside world.
In the new international climate Moscow cannot use the former means and 
devices of the Soviet ideology to hold these states under its control but perform
Irina Lagunina, "Kto dast golubuyu krasku, shtoby pokrasit kaski?," (Who 
may provide the blue paint to color helmets?), Novoe vremva, No.46, 1993,
p.22.
Suzanne Crow, "Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda," RFE/RL Research 
Report. Vol.2, No.50, 17 Dec.1993, p.2.
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more skillful geopolitical maneuvering. Hence, peacekeeping has turned out to be 
a key element in Russia’s general policy. Three aims of Russia’s policy are 
evident; to recapture and preserve its influence in this region, to maintain military 
forces and bases in places where the presence of troops would otherwise not be 
desired, and to prevent the deployment of other international forces for 
peacekeeping.
Russian President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev have made 
several appeals to the General Assembly and CSCE. The last appeal to the 
meeting of foreign ministers of 53 CSCE countries in Rome in November 1993 
for the approval of the deploying Russian peacekeepers in "hot spots" in the 
territory of former USSR under the auspices of either the UN or the CSCE met 
with f a i l u r e . I n  addition to political and financial support from international 
organizations, Russia wants the international community to share its responsibility 
in ca.ses of failure of peacekeeping such as those in the Abkhaz conflict, which 
definitely undermined Russia’s authority and complicated conciliation through the 
participation of the other peacekeepers.
An unwillingness to grant Russia "peacekeeper" status was mostly based 
on political reasons; the East European countries voted against in view of 
possibility of strengthening of Russian influence in these regions. Not willing to
Izvestiva, 3 Dec.1993.
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eliminate the advantage brought about by the CFE Treaty, and the creation of 
independent states in the region, Turkey voted against not only as a geopolitical 
rival for influence in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, but also due to the 
threat of renewed Russian military presence in these areas.
Russia repeatedly argued that the UN is "too busy" with operations in 
other parts of the world to send its forces, while Russia,^^ had not exhausted its 
potential and was still capable of playing a role in settling disputes with the moral 
support of the UN’s Security Council.** Yrii Chizhnik, spokesman for the 
Russian permanent mission to the UN provided a more overt statement; "we have 
the troops, the UN has the technical and material means and the funds."*“'
To support this sophisticated long-term strategy Russia exploits even its 
economic weakness arguing that as a permanent member of the Security Council, 
it has to pay more to the UN than other countries and has a debt around $550 
million including more than $400 million for UN peacekeeping. At the same 
time, despite several agreements for peacekeeping in the CIS, all expenditures for 
operations were covered by the Russian budget; the operations in Tajikistan alone
The daily Russian newspaper ”Commersant" (1992) No.26 published that 
Yeltsin in his visit to the President of the USA, Bush, reached a private 
agreement that vast reduction of armaments from Moscow would be 
compensated by non-interference of the US to the conflicts in the CIS.
^ Interfax, 17 Dec.1992.
Ibid. , 20 Jan. 1993.
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cost 2.3 billion rubles in 1992. 7(1
An acceptable solution can be found only if Russia manages to convince 
the world community that military operations in the CIS are not attempts to 
restore the former role of the USSR but instead are measures to maintain 
international peace and security.^' Not occasionally, Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
has portrayed Russia’s motivation for pursuing peacekeeping missions in the 
former USSR in terms of dilemma: either to try to hold the former USSR 
together as a centralized state or to pull out completely. The first option was 
termed "hopeless" and the second "an unwarranted loss" because Russia had won 
influence in these areas over several centuries. The compromise between the two 
extremes was to maintain military forces and bases in conflict zones for the 
purpose of peacekeeping.^·
The unwillingness of the international community to grant Russia 
peacekeeping functions compelled Moscow to shift its focus toward the 
recognition of the CIS by the UN, CSCE and other authoritative bodies as a 
regional or international organization although the virtual essence of this move 
remained the same - to preserve Russian influence in these areas.
Suzanne Crow, "Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional Peacekeeping," p. 32
The case studies witness the opposite, indicating that Russia strives
for reassertion of her influence in the ex-USSR.
Nezavlslmava aazeta, 24 November 1993.
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If the CIS gains the status of an international organization, Russian 
officials^·’ justify peacekeeping efforts by referring to Article 52 of the Charter;
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of 
regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as 
are appropriate for regional action, provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
Accordingly, the use of force would fall under the conditions of Article 
51 of the Charter containing the inalienable right to individual or collective self- 
defence.^''
Vladimir Shustov, the Head of Russia’s delegation to the CSCE, pointed
out that
"in the case of operations within the sense of Article 52... no 
additional legitimization by any international organization, 
including the CSCE, is required. The peacekeeping operations 
conducted on the territory of the former USSR at the request of the 
parties to the conflict and with the participation of a third party are 
legitimate and do not conflict with the Charter of UN or the 
principles of the CSCE. Because the actions of the third party ... 
are aimed at eliminating a crisis situation. This goal is in line with 
the interests of all the CSCE participating states and with our 
organization’s basic task - the strengthening of stability and
’’ Suzanne Crow, "Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization," 
RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.3, No.II, 18 March 1994, p.36.
Suzanne Crow, "Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization", 
p.36.
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security in the CSCE area. > i 7 i
As a matter of fact, there might be two kinds of approval by the UN or 
CSCE of peacekeeping in the CIS; an overall and in advance legitimization of all 
the CIS (virtually Russian) peacekeeping operations or an ad hoc (case-by-case) 
legitimization by authoritative bodies of the operations as in the case of the Gulf 
War. Russia’s position follows more along the lines of the first.
The overall and in advance legitimization would provide a "carte blanche" 
for Russian-dominated peacekeeping. It would automatically legitimize the 
deployment of Russian armed forces in the "near abroad", in places where they 
are not desired or subject to withdrawal. Since the CIS will inevitably be 
dominated by Russia, it would serve as an additional platform for the promotion 
of Russian interests. Thus, given a free hand, funds, and international support for 
the conduct of the peacekeeping operations would justify Russia’s presence in all 
areas of the ex-USSR since the other smaller and poorer members would not be 
able to interact as independent states on the world scene. This legitimization 
would also affect the rights of national minorities within the Russian Federation 
and their claims to statehood.
cited in Suzanne Crow, ibid. , pp.36,37.
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Russian researcher Boris Martynov wrote that "the UN and international 
organizations... [such as] the CIS could play an important role in managing the 
"march to sovereignty."^* Predicting such a tendency, Henry Kissinger argues 
that
"Russian leaders try - at least tacitly - to keep open the option of 
repeating the events of 1917-1922, when many of the current 
group of independent republics attempted to break away only to be 
forced in the end to Moscow’s fold... It is so-called ethnic 
conflicts that will be the most likely pretexts of 
recentralization.
It makes sense because the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation 
adopted in November 1992 has legitimized the use of peacekeeping forces in the 
Federation's territory in cases of conflicts.’’*
It is too early to say that the CIS is a plausible arrangement. Versatile 
agreements signed among the CIS’s governments toward closer co-operation 
witnessed the opposite. In the spring of 1993 the agreement on the United Ruble 
Zone was initialed but by the fall Moscow issued new money. The agreement on
Boris Martynov, "Self-Determination Requires a Responsible Approach," 
International Affairs, No.6, June 1993, p.58.
Henry Kissinger, ’’Charter of Confusion," Washington Post, 5 July 1992, 
p.c7, cited in James E. Goodby, "Collective Security in Europe After the 
Cold War," Journal of International Affairs, Vol.46, No.2, Winter 
1993, pp.299-321.
"Osnovnye Polozheniya Voennoi Doctriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii" (The Main 
Principles of Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), Izvestiva, 18 
December 1993, pp.1,4.
49
collective security was signed on 15 May, 1992 but the United Military High 
Command was abolished.’*'
There are two tendencies in the CIS: first, closer co-operation within the 
Commonwealth on a confederative basis and second, a re-creation of one united 
state. Correspondingly, there is an alternative to the development of peacekeeping 
operations in the former USSR. If the CIS becomes one state, certainly the 
problem of legitimization of peacekeeping would be an internal issue of the state. 
If the CIS proves to be viable as a Commonwealth, there needs to be closer co­
operation among the UN, CSCE and other authoritative bodies on the one side 
and the CIS on the other, to work out a system of collective security according 
to the internationally accepted norms. Russia as a "great power" would participate 
in peacekeeping but on the basis of ad hoc approval by international authoritative 
bodies. A case-by-case authorization may help the small states of the CIS to act 
in the international arena as equal partners and to guarantee non-violation of 
international norms. A particular evaluation (by the UN or CSCE) of each 
conflict before sending peacekeeping force may provide better consideration of 
the conflicting parties’ concerns to avoid any undue influence.
"If the Western countries, acting through the UN or the CSCE are 
prepared to insist that collective security operations should be
Elena Pestruhina, "Rossiya i sodruzhestvo nezavisimykh sosedei" (Russia 
and the Commonwealth of Independent Neighbors), Megapolis-Exoress. No.12, 
6 Apr.1994.
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mounted where necessary in former Soviet republics and are 
prepared to provide the energy and resources to make this happen, 
there will exist a viable alternative to Russian intervention. 
Otherwise, none exists.’"“'
The real danger of regional conflicts for international peace and security 
is evident and needs to be confronted. From this point of view, the positive and 
negative experiences of conflict settlement in the CIS cannot simply be discarded 
but should be carefully considered for elaboration of a new kind of regional 
peacekeeping in the new environment.
James E. Goodby, op .cit. , p.321
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